Introduction
The December 1991 Maastricht European Council 1 marked the end of the 1990-91
Intergovernmental Conferences on European Political Union and Economic and
Monetary Union, and the beginning of a lengthy process of ratification. These events have encouraged broad analysis of the Treaty on European Union itself and the role played by Member States in its negotiation. 2 Yet, despite the significance of the talks, little scholarly attention has been paid to analysing individual aspects of the negotiations.
This is true both of what proved to be key subjects such as monetary union and social
This was true both for the negotiations under the auspices of the IGC on political union and those within the parameters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
The latter was more concerned with defence than foreign policy questions. 8 A further external influence was the United States. Any changes to European security structures, and the pre-established dominance of NATO, clearly impinged on the most important member. The US was particularly concerned that a reduction in Europe's dependence upon it would undermine the rationale for its involvement in the Alliance, and thus accelerate the erosion of domestic support for basing American troops in Europe -a view starkly expressed in the 20 February 1991 'Bartholomew memorandum'. 9 In addition to such external determinants, the CFSP negotiations were characterised by the dominance exerted by France, Germany and Britain. This was primarily the product of both geopolitical and strategic considerations. Any attempt to create a European defence force hung on the participation of Paris and London, the only Member States with both the necessary quantity and quality of military resources. This accordingly gave them greater negotiating leverage. By contrast, Bonn's central status was characterised by both its geographic and historic significance to European security.
The predominance of key Member States was also symptomatic of the diplomatic dynamics of IGC negotiations: Article 236 of the Treaty noted that 'common accord' among Member States was necessary for determining 'the amendments to be made to this Treaty'. Thus, Community institutions did not play a significant role. The European Parliament was only peripherally involved, taking no part in the weekly negotiations at official level, and while the Commission was permitted to take part in these talks, its representatives only attended infrequently. 10 Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission, seemingly did not want Commission proposals to be constrained by the formalities of the IGC negotiating group, where texts could be modified by Member
States. This pursuit of independence, however, diluted the Commission's influence on EPU. When it did put forward a text in the external relations field, it was not acceptable to anybody, even federalist minded states such as Belgium.
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Once the negotiations were underway, the Member States basically divided into two groups: those wanting the Europeans to be able to act alone in security operations, if necessary on a large scale, and those who favoured a more minimalist line, working closely with the US and NATO. These groups divided in turn into two further alliances:
those who considered that security co-operation should remain intergovernmental, and those who believed a future European security policy should be integrated into the main EC Treaty and subject to qualified majority voting (QMV) (see Table 1 ). Predictably, London was in the vanguard of those who insisted that decision-taking should be done by intergovernmental means and that NATO should continue to be the cornerstone of European Security. 12 Britain was the strongest advocate of a key US role, but this position was shared by several smaller Member States including Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal. For London, the need for US support was not just based on historic sentiment for the Anglo-American special relationship, but also by the harsh reality of the Gulf War, 13 which indicated that an integrated, separate, European security and defence identity was unlikely to emerge, 14 especially as any concept of unity diminished once it became evident sanctions and diplomatic initiatives would not solve the crisis. 15 A product of the lack of cohesion in the Community was that Britain was one of the few European countries to send a large force to the region, 16 which consequently helped to breathe new life into the Anglo-American special relationship. The latter document stressed that the European Council should be responsible for deciding which areas of security policy would be classified as common policy, 24 and advocated the development of an 'organic' relationship between the WEU and EPU. 25 It therefore contrasted with London's preference for a simple 'linkage' between the European Council and WEU.
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The Institutional Debate
In the wake of such early broadsides, Member States' attention became increasingly focused on other topics, including institutional questions, which were of particular relevance to CFSP discussions. 27 Here the Commission, European Parliament and certain countries such as Belgium, Germany and Greece, favoured the integration of CFSP into the Treaty as an individual chapter with its own decision-making principles, resulting in it becoming one of the main branches in the tree-like structure which they formula with a unitary structure, 36 it gave more concrete form to common action and cooperation on CFSP. 37 This approach, which had been outlined in an earlier text on 13
September, 38 was criticised by many Member States at an officials meeting on 26
September, particularly France and Britain. 39 It was therefore inevitable that it would fail at the 30 September Brussels General Affairs Council, 40 with Belgium the sole supporter. 41 Agreement was consequently reached that the Luxembourg draft would form the basis of future negotiations, 42 but another revision of the Dutch text was put forward, which contained certain communitarian features, including a majority voting procedure for foreign policy, in early November to be debated by Foreign Ministers at the Noordwijk 'conclave' on 12-13 November. This still fell short of British objectives, overridden by majority voting'. 43 Differences were accordingly not solved at Noordwijk, 44 after which a sizeable gulf remained between Britain and the more integrationist states on the nature of foreign and defence policy, London insisting upon its right to both take vital decisions independently and decision taking by unanimous vote.
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A Very British Coup
In the midst of these arguments, the most striking and public evidence of British engagement in the CFSP negotiations had taken place on the eve of the Foreign
Ministers' meeting at Haarzuilen on 5-6 October, when London and Rome put forward a joint proposal as a basis for Ministerial discussions. 46 Anglo-Italian co-operation had been set in motion some six months earlier at a lunch meeting in Rome on Easter
Monday between Hurd and his Italian counterpart, Gianni De Michelis. 47 Political union implies the gradual elaboration and implementation of a common foreign and security policy and a stronger European defence identity with the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy compatible with the common defence policy we already have with our allies in NATO. 48 This wording was only agreed after a prolonged debate, particularly with regard to the 'common defence policy', which proved to be a major and conscious British concession. London did, however, consider it important to stipulate that any future common defence policy should, from the beginning, be defined as needing to be compatible with NATO's common defence policy. At the same time, other Member
States' acceptance that there already existed a common defence policy within NATO (and that any future European policy had to be compatible with it) was perceived as a valuable concession to Britain prior to Maastricht. 49 For De Michelis, the significance of the text was that:
For the first time, the British are accepting the perspective of a common defence policy. This is the decisive phrase in the text, and it represents a historical turning point for the United Kingdom. It signifies that Major's government has decided to move towards European Union. The main obstacle on the road to Maastricht has been lifted. 50 Both de Michelis and Hurd were of a high enough standing to enable them to sell the agreement to their respective domestic communities. 51 The text was accurately The Anglo-Italian proposal demonstrated a spirit of British engagement with the government prepared to compromise so as to obtain influence within the negotiations.
Flexibility was, however, heavily influenced by the lack of backbench scrutiny inside of
Westminster. 53 This contrasted with EMU, where MPs tended to be aware of the government's negotiating position, a factor influenced by opposition to a single currency and desire for an opt-out formula. 54 Italy too perceived the text as a means of obtaining influence, primarily by ensuring that it was not overshadowed by the Franco-German The proposal's very importance was emphasised by Delors view that it represented 'a step towards a compromise'. 57 Its effect was to therefore counter the Franco-German axis in the short term and tilt the negotiations away from the maximalist position.
Any euphoria in London was threatened on 11 October, when France and Germany proposed the creation of a European corps as part of an EC-wide defence organisation. 58 Differing from the Anglo-Italian initiative, it recommended an organic link between the EC and the WEU. By advocating a WEU rapid reaction force (whereas the former aimed at strengthening NATO), it came as a sudden shock to Britain. 59 But the setback for London's preference of a NATO orientated ESDI proved to be shortlived, as a result of NATO's new 'Strategic Concept' ratified at the November 1991
Rome Summit. Endorsing the development of European multinational forces '...in the cohesion and reinforced the transatlantic partnership. 60 Significantly, it reasserted the primary role of NATO in the realm of defence:
The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.
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Emerging from the NATO quadripartite group, consisting of Britain, France, Germany and the US, the text's true significance lay in France's participation, as she had originally not taken part in the revision of NATO strategy. 62 Although the majority of NATO communiqués are normally rubber stamped by Heads of State and Government, on this occasion President François Mitterrand was initially not prepared to accept the text. 63 Indeed, it seemed he might 'reject the whole damn thing because he had not seen the text before the meeting'. 64 Mitterrand's hostility was 'not because he saw it as a serious problem, but because he saw it as symptomatic of the US encroaching on purely European institutions'. 65 The text's emphasis on the importance of NATO did nevertheless mean that the original Franco-German proposal was no longer a viable option and therefore Britain proceeded to the Maastricht European Council with greater optimism on the CFSP issue.
The Maastricht European Council
A combination of the multiplicity of topics covered at Maastricht and the priority given to social policy and EMU, led most details of the CFSP settlement to be negotiated by Member States' Political Directors. Agreement was brokered on the second day, 66 policy having been hammered out on the margins. This was clearly symptomatic of the negotiations as a whole, where the CFSP dossier had been frozen out of the debate for months in early 1991. In broad terms, the outcome was a compromise more favourable to the Atlanticist vision of Britain than the integrated approach of France and Germany.
Member governments were made the dominant actors in the CFSP field, 67 with the European Council granted the ability to set general guidelines and the Council of Foreign
Ministers to act as the decision-maker. 68 Internationally, CFSP was to be represented by the Community Presidency, which would have general responsibility for implementing measures under the Council.
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Of the WEU-related issues, the main problem concerned the declaration dealing with membership. This was partly because Greece made it clear in the days prior to
Maastricht that it would have difficulty adopting the Council's conclusions if it continued to be excluded from the WEU. 70 The problem was solved at the very last stage by the concept of WEU full members and observers, only members of both the EC and NATO could become full members of the WEU, with other NATO countries (Turkey, Norway and Iceland) being permitted Associate membership. 71 This created the possibility of Greek membership of the WEU and meant that Turkey (with whom it had a conflict of views over Cyprus) could not become a WEU member until it was granted EC membership (of which Greece was the main opposition). This concept of membership was a concession secured by France and Germany and represented a setback for Britain's approach, whose government did not want to turn non-WEU members, such as Turkey and Norway, into second class citizens in defence questions.
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Significantly, however, the concept of Associate membership was linked to a proposal by De Michelis which gave such members 'the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU', 73 a guarantee which was clearly helpful to London. In contrast, the main WEU declaration involved no substantial problems because the November NATO Rome Summit had ironed out many differences. 74 Otherwise, the main question concerned the defence clause of the WEU, with
Britain being against the creation of a common defence. To this end, a change was made to an earlier Belgian proposal which suggested that 'the common defence policy should in time lead to a genuine common defence', 75 so that the eventual wording noted that 'the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence'. 76 This notion of a common defence was assisted by the earlier Anglo-Italian declaration, although London managed to secure that Union policy would be 'compatible with the common security and defence policy' 77 established within the NATO framework, which was also a development on the AngloItalian declaration. 78 The position of NATO was thus safeguarded and a common defence policy put off into the future.
In terms of operational capability, the Maastricht agreement allowed for the establishment of common positions on foreign policy, 79 which were designed to ensure that co-operation took place between Member States to utilise their combined diplomatic influence. 80 In pursuing common aims the Treaty provided for joint actions 81 as a means of implementing objectives, with the General Affairs Council deciding the matters suitable for joint action. 82 Although the Treaty was based upon unanimous decision-making, certain implementatory measures within the scope of joint actions could be taken by QMV. 83 The formula 'unanimity for substantive decisions, QMV for implementing decisions' had been pushed at Maastricht by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Britain objected to the use of QMV, pressing for unanimity on all matters, whereas virtually all other Member States wanted the mixed procedure. 84 The introduction of QMV therefore represented a compromise on the part of Britain, although the government was not unduly concerned. While undesirable,
London considered it a manageable and small inroad into policy. 85 The very limitations placed on QMV reflected the desire of many states for national control over foreign and defence policy, as emphasised by national action being allowed in areas determined for joint action, should 'imperative need' require (although the Council was to be immediately informed of the necessity for such action).
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Yet, whatever the current limits, the development of common positions and joint actions suggested Member States would in due course progress from the codification of a common security policy to 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence '. 87 In that respect the WEU was central to the process of establishing a common defence policy. 
